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Science and Social Change: A
Conversation with Robert Sapolsky
Dr. Robert Sapolsky is John A. and Cynthia Fry Gunn Professor of
Biological Sciences at Stanford University, Professor of Neurology and
Neurosurgery in Stanford’s School of Medicine, and a research associ-
ate at the Institute of Primate Research of the National Museums of
Kenya. Sapolsky is a recipient of a MacArthur genius fellowship and
the author of several truly important books, including Stress, the Aging
Brain and the Mechanisms of Neuron Death (1992); Why Zebras Don’t Get
Ulcers: A Guide to Stress-Related Diseases and Coping (1995), a finalist for
the Los Angeles Times Book Award, The Trouble with Testosterone
(1997); A Primate’s Memoir: A Neuroscientist’s Unconventional Life
Among the Baboons (2002); Monkeyluv: And Other Essays on Our Lives as
Animals (2005); and Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best andWorst,
one of theWashington Post’s Ten Best Books of 2017. An advocate of sci-
ence in and for the general public, he regularly publishes essays in
Discover, Science, Scientific American, Harper’s, and The New Yorker.
Sapolsky’s best-selling account of his life’s work,A Primate’s Memoir,
chronicles the changing personalities and social structures of a troop of
baboons over two decades and its near-destruction by environmental
poisoning; many of the males contracted bovine tuberculosis from
infected meat and organs (scraps left in the garbage dump of a nearby
tourist lodge). The most interesting finding of Sapolsky’s primatologi-
cal research, however, follows the events described in this book.
Among primates, baboons are famously aggressive; as Sapolsky
puts it, “they’re no one’s favorite species” (299). Sapolsky began study-
ing the biology of stress through baboons because their societies, like
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the human society Sapolsky comes from (he is based in the American
academy), are hierarchical and aggressive: “Basically, baboons [in the
Serengeti] have about a half a dozen solid hours of sunlight a day to de-
vote to being rotten to each other. Just like our society . . . . We live well
enough to have the luxury to get ourselves sick with purely social, psy-
chological stress” (15). But in the years following the TB epidemic,
which killed the most aggressive males, the culture of the troop
changed radically. In the 2008 National Geographic documentary Killer
Stress, Sapolsky states that before the TB deaths, this troop was “your
basic old baboon troop at the time, whichmeansmales were aggressive
and society was highly stratified.” Following the deaths, however,
what you were left with was twice as many females as
males, and the males who were remaining were, you
know, just to use scientific jargon, they were good guys.
They were not aggressive jerks. They were nice to the
females. They were socially-affiliated. It completely
transformed the atmosphere of the troop. And when
new adolescent males joined the troop, they’d come in
just as jerky as any adolescent males elsewhere on this
planet, and it would take them about six months to learn
we’re not like that in this troop. We don’t do stuff like
that. We’re not that aggressive. We spend more time
grooming each other. Males are calmer with each other.
You do not dump on a female if you are in a bad mood.
And it takes these new guys about six months and they
assimilate this style [of social life] and you have baboon
culture. And this particular troop has a culture of very
low levels of aggression and very high levels of social af-
filiation. And they’re doing that 20 years later. (Killer
Stress)
This is, for me, one of the most significant and the most hopeful scien-
tific discoveries of the century. It suggests, as Saplosky puts it in the
documentary, “if they [these baboons] are able to in one generation
transform what are supposed to be textbook social systems, sort of en-
graved in stone, we don’t have an excuse when we say there are certain
inevitabilities about human social systems.”
His most recent book, the epic 800þ page-turner Behave, is no less
than a “magisterial account of human behavior.”1 As the review in the
Guardian from which this laurel hails also points out in bold type,
Behave argues that humans (and, presumably, animals in general) do
not have free will. This account of the origins of human behavior, from
the micro-increments of the neuronal mechanisms of individual
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cognition to large scale social formations and cultural institutions, is an
amazing synthesis of many disciplines and interdisciplinary areas of
inquiry. Behave translates the findings of countless observations and
experiments in a range of fields to create a clear, cogent picture of our
current scientific understanding of human behavior for the general
public and make a compelling argument for the broad ethical implica-
tions of this work. It is interesting that a book which painstakingly
demonstrates the biological and cultural mechanisms that precede,
permeate, and evenmasquerade as individual human agency has such
high and genuine hopes for our ability to “listen to reason”: Behave is,
as much as anything else, a manifesto for desperately needed social
change. But, as theGuardian has it, “It remains debatable whether strict
determinism is compatible with Sapolsky’s final message of hope for
humanity.”
I spoke with Sapolsky in May 2018. Long an admirer of his work, I
was thrilled to find him equally wonderful in conversation.
HF: You have been hailed, by many, as one of the very best scientific
writers of the day. You’re a very busy Stanford professor. What is
the impulse behind writing for general readers?
RS: Everybody out there is a de facto behavior biologist—that’s the
case every time we serve on a jury, judge the morality of someone’s
actions, figure out how to deal with a troubled and troubling fam-
ily member—and so they might as well become an informed one!
There are real consequences of people being informed or unin-
formed about science. And we scientists should, in principle, be
immensely excited about the stuff we think about; the chance to
get other people excited too is irresistible.
HF: So, writing is partly an extension of pedagogy?
RS: I think certainly teaching is part of it, but I also very much like
writing. But I’m not a writer. Growing up, I was more of a musi-
cian. But conducting fieldwork in Africa, given the stretches of
time in the isolation, you become very, very dependent on mail
from people. You start writing to lots of people to get letters back.
Sitting out there for long stretches, and writing to a lot of people, I
discovered that writing was something I really enjoyed.
HF: Writing an enormous book like Behave (as opposed to A Primates
Memoir, which is also wonderful; I teach it often and students love
it) must be an incredible challenge.
RS: You know, I had many bad moments in the shower. I spent a lot
of time during the writing of the book thinking: I’m not going to
be able to do this. To give you a sense of what I got myself into: I’d
been collecting notes for this book since I was in college.
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When I finally sat down to do it, for each chapter I averaged a cou-
ple of thousands of pages of notes that I accumulated from reading
over the years. And so, I closed my research lab and stopped re-
search altogether 5 years ago to write this book. This was a big deci-
sion and a big transition for me. This was the first time I thought of
writing as anything other than a hobby for the evening or commut-
ing on the train. It’s also the first time I wrote a book for a deadline,
which created all sorts of anxieties I had never experienced before
as a writer.
So, yes, this one just seemed very daunting. I wanted to get this
book really right and so this was the first book during which I had
sustained writer’s block. I would pace around thinking: I’m not go-
ing to be able to do this, and I’ve bitten off more than I can chew.
HF: Among other things, Behave demonstrates the constellation of
flawed assumptions about consciousness and culpability made by
the American criminal justice system. How we judicate and punish
people is a political matter (as is everything that’s related to crime:
the distribution of resources, and systems of health care and edu-
cation). How can science meaningfully intervene in these as politi-
cal matters?
RS: I’m certainly spending a lot of time thinking about this. I’ve been
working with public defenders on a whole bunch of murder trials
in which brain damage or childhood adversity [figure promi-
nently]. To my mind, these are poster-child cases for volition as a
suspect concept.
It has been beyond interesting, to see the justice system up close
and to try to get people to think differently about issues of [culpabil-
ity]. How science is supposed to get people to think differently
about virtually everything, about our very behavior, I haven’t a
clue. At the moment I’m in the middle of reading this ghastly book,
The Falling Sickness: A History of Epilepsy From the Greeks to the
Beginnings of Modern Neurology; it’s a grisly history of epilepsy that a
historian of science wrote in the 1940s. He spends a ridiculous
amount of time discussing different Greek physicians and what
herbs they used to treat seizures. The book tries to make sense of
how people made that jump, somewhere in the last 500 years, of
thinking about epilepsy as something other than demonic posses-
sion. I use that example in my lectures endlessly. If there’s any room
for optimism, epilepsy is the example of it because it used to be con-
sidered demonic possession; the medical intervention was abso-
lutely clear: you burn the people at the stake. Somewhere along the
way, people formulated the concept of disease [and applied it to
this disorder]. [And poof!] It’s not sleeping with Satan that screws
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up an epileptic’s potassium channels; yahoo peasants with pitch-
forks don’t show up for a ceremonial burning of an epileptic’s driv-
er’s license.
And society hasn’t fallen apart. This example is, in some ways, a
model for what we’re going to have to do. Childhood adversity pro-
duces a terribly weak frontal cortex, which is why some individuals
make horrible, damaging choices and have done terrible things to
innocent people around them. Yes, people ought to be safe from
them, but [we don’t need to torture them.] I’m a little bit optimistic
that we can [make this cultural change], though I feel pessimistic
that it has taken about 500 years for us to get this far, and that shift
has predominately been in the West. Back in Kenya, for example, if
somebody’s got epilepsy, the odds are it will not be interpreted as a
problemwith his potassium channels.
HF: Science, it seems to me, is in the best sense always political; it has
real implications for how we live, how we make ethical decisions,
and who we consider worthy of ethical consideration. Behave dem-
onstrates how interconnected biology and culture and environ-
ment are and, for this reason, why we need to be very skeptical of
any reductive theory, solution, or worldview.
RS: Yes, and if all that anybody gets from a book like this is: it’s all
very complicated, so be really cautious before you decide you un-
derstand why people behave as they do, especially if these are
behaviors that you judge harshly.
HF: The Trouble with Testosterone, A Primate’s Memoir, and Monkeyluv
are funny, touching books; they speak with such a clear, compel-
ling voice. Where does this literary voice come from? What are
your favorite genres, your favorite writers?
RS: I read tons of science fiction. I went through the obligatory stage
of being able to quote long passages of anything written by Joseph
Heller, Tom Wolf, and Kurt Vonnegut. And science writers, like
Lewis Thomas and David Quammen. Of course, H.G. Wells,
Philip K. Dick, and Ursula LeGuin I adore.
HF: You also have an interest in art; you mention Goya in one essay,
Mahler in another. As you’ve written, we don’t need neuroscience
to confirm the validity of people’s feelings or, in this case, the value
of art. I am, though, curious about the effect of art, of the ambigu-
ity of art, on ethical reasoning. Might ambiguity lead to, for lack of
a better phrase, prefrontal cortex “overload” and fewer prosocial
choices, given that cognitive processes act as a gatekeeper of the
intuitionist roots of morality (Behave 482–83)? I am thinking, in
part, of experiments you discuss that demonstrate the conservative
dislike of ambiguity (Behave 450–55).
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RS: There was a wonderful study2 (as far as I can tell probably the
only time somebody at the New School for Social Research pub-
lished in Science) that demonstrated that when people read litera-
ture (art) as opposed to popular fiction (I’m forgetting exactly how
they defined the two, but literature involved much more ambigu-
ity than popular fiction) they get much better at theory of mind
tasks. Reading literature increases your ability to understand
what’s going on in somebody else’s head. The punchline of their
paper was this: you become more cognitively complex (your social
brain abilities) reading ambiguous fiction than unambiguous fic-
tion. That makes perfect sense, and it makes perfect sense in the
context of the political divide between progressives and conserva-
tives. Literature not only [teaches the basic lesson that] different
people think differently, it teaches us that [people and the world
are] complicated. The pieces don’t always fit together completely
or clearly. It’s also training in holding your breath, pausing before
deciding you understand what’s going on.
And, importantly, [exposure to literature can] take the anxiety out
of trying to process ambiguity. A key difference between social con-
servatives and progressives is that ambiguity is not just confusing
to conservatives, it’s frightening, anxiety provoking. For them, a
world that’s not very clear and familiar, isn’t exciting; it’s scary. This
fundamental difference is a major cognitive divide: is novelty excit-
ing or scary? Being trained to experience and understand ambiguity
is fantastic. Of course, trying to figure out what the hell some poet is
saying isn’t as menacing as all of society changing in ways that you
can’t understand. For some, ambiguity [means a] lack of control, a
lack of predictability . . . [all the way to the feeling that] society’s
coming apart and people like me are becoming irrelevant.
HF: Yes, I think we find a good deal of evidence of this in the political
life of the US, where rates of meaningful literacy are relatively low.
Speaking of the desire for clarity (if not simplicity), I want to ask
you a bit about physics envy among the behavioral biologists, the
way some covet the kind of answers revealed by molecular biol-
ogy or physics. Do biologists become overwhelmed by the stagger-
ing complexity of their subject?
RS: Oh, I think it’s a major occupational hazard. Almost every branch
of biology is filled with people who, at some point or other think,
if only I could get more molecular in my approach to X . . . Not only
would they be much more impressive and flashy, but they’d get
down to “fundamentals.” And, well, it doesn’t work that way.
More reductive scientific approaches don’t give clearer answers
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than more integrated ones; to the extent that they give clear
answers, they give clear answers about the gears of a clock.
Sometimes the gears are incredibly important, but very little that’s
most interesting about large biological systems revolve around
gears.
HF: That’s a great answer. Behave reminds me of another sweeping
book, E.O. Wilson’s Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (1998).
Behave not only embraces the complexity of the subject, but the
seeming “ephemera” of the correlation and contingency of biology
and environment. Given how poorly many people responded to
sociobiology in the 1970s, how do we help academics and the pub-
lic to see culture as biological and biology as cultural without be-
ing reductive of either end?
RS: It’s hugely difficult. When I was in graduate school, this incredi-
bly famous pharmacological biochemist (who played a central role
in the development of all the leading antihypertensive medicines
of the last 50 years) gave a talk at his 80th birthday. After many
people had given talks about his important contributions, how
many umpteen lives had been saved by his work, by thousands of
millions of people taking his medications each year, he got up and
gave the most amazing talk. He said, “Well, I’ve recently decided
that I’ve pretty much wasted the last 40 years of my career.
Coming up with newer antihypertensives helps save lives, but
what I should have been spending this last half-century figuring
out is why people stop taking their medications earlier than they
should.” I thought, oh my God. He said that roughly 90% of peo-
ple who take antihypertensives, which they ought to take for the
rest of their lives, stop taking them at prescribed rate within 6
months.
That’s a great example of how tough it is to get many scientists to
[think less reductively or think about culture]. When I give my
stress talks these days I always ask the audience the same question:
“Answer the following question and you’ll do more good for hu-
man health than anyone since Jonas Salk: why is it that when we
feel like nobody loves us we eat M&M’s? Get the answer to that and
you’ll have cured half the cases of adult-onset diabetes in this
country.” And people think: Whoa! That’s the level at which we
should be intervening? It is incredibly difficult to get people to think
differently because reductive models are very intellectually satisfy-
ing to people who think logically, and because reductivemodels are
a hell of a lot better at solving medical problems than sacrificing
goat innards to the gods. Reductive models have done wonders
with pathogens in the water that make you sick and vaccines, for
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example. But the really big biological problems we face these days
have very little to dowith reductive biology.
HF: Another great answer, and one which demonstrates that the task
of facing and thinking through ambiguity and complexity may be
as difficult for some scientists as for the general public, albeit for
different reasons. Here is another complex, cultural question:
Western culture is founded on a belief of human superiority, often
cast as a transcendence of nature. Does primatology, as a field, still
contain an unexamined speciesism, a sense of humans as ulti-
mately superior to rather than on a continuum with other
primates?
RS: I think truly good primatologists, and there’s a lot of them out there
by now, absolutely think in terms of a continuum. They spend a
whole lot more time thinking about similarities than differences, or if
they think about differences, they think about what are the rules that
have given rise to those differences. We all are subject to similar selec-
tive mechanisms when it comes to the evolution of behavior; that’s
why we’re different from marmoset monkeys. If anything, the really
hairy, hard core field biologists usually prefer their species to
humans.
HF: Primatologist Frans de Waal argues that if anthropomorphism is
risky, “its opposite carries a risk too. To give it a name, I propose
anthropodenial for the a priori rejection of shared characteristics be-
tween humans and animals when in fact they may exist” (de Waal
68–69).3 I’ve noticed a tension in your work between an orthodox
notion of scientific objectivity and all that it implies about rejecting
anthropomorphism, and something more contingent, what de
Waal calls “animalcentric anthropomorphism.”
RS: Yeah, and I think that reflects the fields I’ve straddled intellectu-
ally and emotionally. You know, lab scientists do awful, awful
things to rodents. That’s part of the research I’ve done, and it is
very reductive work. But in fieldwork, I’m thinking about the en-
docrine regulation of social behavior and, say, somatostatin in a
naturalistic setting while, at the same time, loving the animals I
study. Straddling between the lab and the field each year means I
spend part of the year killing animals and part of the year in a po-
sition in which I am far more likely to be killed by them.
Conservation issues come in the back door, too; at times people actually
want me to mow downmy animals! It is a life that’s not very amenable
to clean categories in one’s head. My lab self and my field-primatology
self are very confused;what you do as a lab scientist is distance yourself
as much as possible from the blood and gore that you’ve signed up for,
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which is a world away from your fieldwork. I think the strain of this, of
parts that do not fit togetherwell, shows.
HF: You mention the emerging study of personality in primatology in
Behave. How might this new work change the way we think about
other animals, about nonhuman agency? Individuality is so very im-
portant to humans; I assume we cognitively exaggerate our own indi-
viduality and downplay the individuality of others, particularly other
animals.
RS: Was it George Bernard Shaw who said, “Love is the process of ex-
aggerating the differences between one person and everyone else
in the world”? Often, science is built around exaggerating the dif-
ferences between humans and every other animal in the world.
But in contrast to that view, personality is one of those things that’s
on a continuum among species (although I’ll admit that it took me
a while to come around to the papers on fish personality; I realized
I needed to overcome my primate chauvinism). We obviously re-
vel in the notion of our own individuality, but even that comes
with a footnote (which is that the notion differs in individualist
cultures versus collectivist ones). We are on a continuum with ani-
mals, as well, in terms of individual differences.
HF: In The Ape and the Sushi Master, de Waal wrote, “There is so much
resistance to the idea of animal culture that one cannot escape the
impression that it is an idea whose time has come.” I was thinking
about the huge cultural change in your Keekorok Troop, from typi-
cally aggressive to more socially affiliative. It seems like all of
Behave leads to this revelation: if these baboons can change their
culture, we can change ours too. Would you like to say more about
this? And has the troop maintained this new culture?
RS: Yes, if these baboons can change their culture, we can too. If the
world has unexpectedly gotten so much better in recent centuries,
we can demand that more of the same will happen in the future.
If someone like Hugh Thompson (see below) can emerge from out
of nowhere and act with stunning, brain morality, so can we. And
the more we understand the science that explains how these occur,
the more we can facilitate these happening again.
In terms of the Keekorok Troop—wonderfully, they maintained the
culture for many years, something I dearly rooted for in a way that
is scientifically unseemly (somuch for objectivity. . .). The troop, un-
fortunately, no longer really exists. I don’t really want to go into
details, but the theme is one familiar to many field biologists—your
study subjects don’t do well living in close proximity to humans.
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HF: And what do you think about what primatologist William
McGrew calls the “c-word,” using the word “culture” to describe
nonhuman social learning?
RS: It’s totally valid. You can of course, by definition, make it a con-
cept that is exclusive to humans. But if you define it in a more op-
erational way—it’s a non-genetic transmission of styles of
behavior, intergenerationally or intragenerationally, and it’s not
just a direct outcome of ecological differences. Once dealing with
that definition, we see we’re not the only ones with culture.
Admittedly, though, our versions are orders of magnitude more
interesting.
HF: More interesting to us . . .
RS: That’s true. Probably your average Joe primate might be really
into termites, but not that interested in human theological differen-
ces. De Waal’s entire career, I think, could come down to the
phrase: it’s on a continuum.
HF: Yes, but these are four very important words! Okay, free will at
last: you argue the complex interplay of biology and natural–cul-
tural environment is deterministic without being inevitable, a fine
and interesting distinction (perhaps the most important one of
Behave). People are uncomfortable jettisoning the idea of free will;
you yourself have said that you must live as if it is real (VOX inter-
view with Sean Illing). I think the problem here lies in the false bi-
nary of freedom and determinism: I would argue the more we
learn about ourselves and the world the more we see that nothing
is free and equally nothing is determined. I would like to propose
another way to think about this problem: rather than affirming or
refuting a notion of “free” will, what about replacing this with an
idea of learned will? It represents the complexity of nature and cul-
ture without emphasizing freedom or determinism.
RS: It’s perfect! [I feel sometimes like all I do is address the issue of]
free will, trying to teach people what science demonstrates in that
regard. But, if there’s no free will, if we’re in a deterministic uni-
verse, people ask me, “Why are you going on about the need for
change, if everything is already determined?” Put this way, it
seems contradictory, but it’s not. I’ve been spending a lot of time
thinking about how to argue this point clearly.
I think the emphasis on learning is absolutely perfect. Towards the
end of Behave, I discuss the incredibly inspiring story of Hugh
Thompson, the American soldier who at tremendous personal risk
acted to stop the My Lai massacre. It is dazzling to read what he
did, and then how awful the rest of his life was because of that.
Most of us have a strong propensity towards some version of
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learned helplessness when it comes to changing theworld.We learn
the bad guys win; the odds are stacked against you; you can’t fight
city hall. By around age 25, most of us have learned this passivity [if
not] cynicism about the world. There is a way to think of this neuro-
biologically, in terms of dopamine and the frontal cortex; this learn-
ing has produced a [cognitive] reality in which someone stepping
forward and trying to make a massive, brave change about some-
thing or other in a moment of crisis is highly unlikely. Or, put it this
way: a frontal cortex that can’t pull off a big change because it has
been trained to be helpless.
And then you hear the story of someone like Thompson, and feel
“inspired.” On a neurobiological level, inspiration means there’s
nowmaybe three and a half frontal neurons that are a little bit more
perky in the face of the otherwise [ingrained response of] “Oh my
God, this is too big a problem, nobody can make a difference,” or
“somebody else will take care of it,” or “I’m tired,” or “I’m scared,”
or “I’m just going to look the other way and pretend this didn’t hap-
pen.” Now there are three more neurons, three fingers on the other
side of the scale, ever so slightly tilting you in the direction of actu-
ally doing something brave the next time. You have been inspired
by the example of another person and, as a result, you may act dif-
ferently. That’s a scenario of change that does not require the idea of
free will. It’s exactly what you said; it’s a type of learning that trig-
gers another type of learning.
But whenwe get demoralized, when the NRAwins [another victory
over common sense and the common good], something vaguely re-
sembling the opposite happens. In other words, our experience of
the world leaves a biological trace in our brains that makes certain
future social behaviors more or less likely. Inspiration is the phe-
nomenon of overcoming our learned helplessness about big diffi-
cult things in the world.
HF: That’s wonderful. Well, it only makes sense. If the effects of
trauma are real (and we know they are), then something like its
opposite must also be real.
RS: Yes, even on a low level, like if you’re driving and you see some-
body in front of you with one of those “Mean People Suck’ bum-
per stickers. . .
HF: Yes, a visceral moment of optimism.
RS: 30 seconds later you might slow down to let somebody else in to
change lanes. That’s biology [in action], not free will.
HF: Of course, all of this depends on the driver’s general disposition,
upbringing, culture. . .
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RS: It does, which is why it would work with only a subset of people.
[Take Behave.] If somebody’s reading a book like that, she’s proba-
bly had enough good, lucky things happen in her life that she’s in
the subset of people who are more predisposed to being inspired
by something as unlikely as a book about science.
HF: So many scientists (and nonscientists too, theorists and scholars
of the humanities) use machine-metaphors when speaking about
the brain, particularly computer terminology, phrases such as
“hard-wired.” Should we be worried about the way this metaphor
acts as a feedback loop? If computers are commodities, and meta-
phor shapes how we think about things, should we be concerned
about the way these metaphors shape the way we approach partic-
ular problems in behavior or neuroscience?
RS: Yes absolutely. The metaphors we live by [matter]. It is amusing
to look back on metaphors from earlier periods in science. All sorts
of people in the 70’s wrote useless, impenetrable theoretical papers
on the brain as hologram, and years before on the brain as vacuum
tubes. It’s silly, and it’s only recently that technologists have pulled
in the opposite direction with computers as neural networks. But,
yes, the machine metaphor is particularly scary these days be-
cause, sitting in the shadow of Silicon Valley, it’s mighty hard not
to see that technology dominating an awful lot of the world.
HF: In the past you’ve been somewhat positive about social media. Of
course, the negative stuff about the internet is all too obvious,
whether it’s human trafficking facilitated by the dark web or bil-
lionaires pouring money into the Transhumanist agenda of becom-
ing downloadable information, escaping their bodies into the
“cloud.”
RS: Yep, all those things. I suspect that the Bay Area with its tech
moguls will, 33 years from now, be the world center of frozen
dead people in very expensive vaults. The institutes funded by
Silicon Valley gajillionaires that will be devoted to slowing, stop-
ping, or reversing aging will be just dizzying. But among the most
dangerous manifestation of the internet is, far and away, that as a
teenager you can feel crappy about yourself because of a party you
haven’t been invited to on the other side of the planet, that the
ways in which you feel inadequate are amplified. Social media
seems a celebration of our tendency to compare our inner selves
with the external selves that everyone else presents.
HF: That must create a lot of conformity, make people less likely to
see things differently or take social risks.
RS: Yes. You do anything through social media and you will soon
find out what hundreds of people think of what you did.
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HF: You reference Steven Pinker’s book on violence (The Better Angels
of our Nature) several times in Behave; you point out some of the
flaws of the book but ultimately seem to agree with his thesis that
humans are less violent today. Granted, moral philosophy and sci-
ence have made progress, and the average standard of living or
quality of life has improved. However, one might argue humanity
as a whole does not progress precisely because, despite such philo-
sophical and scientific progress, systemic violence not only contin-
ues but grows. For example, in 2013 there were at least “27 million
slaves worldwide, more than in 1860, when there were 25 mil-
lion.”4 And in 2016, the estimate rose to “more than 40 million”
slaves worldwide; these are slaves in the strictest sense of the
word (not the much larger number of people for whom their eco-
nomic circumstances make their consent notional).5 Can we really
say we’ve progressed given the kind of progress of which we’re
capable?
RS: I think if one really does take a long view, one sees things have
become much better. What has changed is that we [here in the US]
can be excruciatingly pained by what’s happening [very far away,]
say to Rohingya refugees in Burma. The amount of the world that
one can feel pain for has increased. But as a counter to that, the
amount of damage one damaged individual can do with an auto-
matic weapon (verses a machete 500 years ago) has also increased.
But no matter what we do, no matter how much progress we make
in medical research, by definition there’s always going to be a lead-
ing cause of death, and it’s always going to scare the crap out of
us. It’s always going to take loved ones far sooner than we are pre-
pared for; it is always going to be the stuff of nightmares. And
then there’s always going to be horrific, appalling, heartbreaking
behavior. When it comes down to it, if we had a world in which
only one child a year died of abuse instead of the insane numbers
who do so now, we are set up as humans to feel that pain at least
as much as we do now.
HF: The philosopher of science Rebecca Newberger Goldstein has
said that science is very good at telling us what the world is like,
even sometimes how it works, but it takes the humanities to ad-
dress the question of what it means. What do you think of this?
RS: Absolutely. I think the best encapsulation of this is the recognition
that it’s silly to have doctors make life and death decisions or qual-
ity of life decisions. Doctors are there to tell you what the contin-
gencies and possibilities are, [but not how to live or when to die].
The world of doctors deciding when to pull plugs [should come to
an end.] It is not their job to decide when [someone else’s] life is or
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isn’t worth living. If I were capable of actually understanding po-
etry [well], I would say that’s where the poets come in.
HF: In Behave you discuss the importance of cultivating a certain kind
of detachment, an empathy that is less immediate. You write, “the
more individuals can regulate their adverse empathic emotions,
the more likely they are to act prosocially” (169). How is this dif-
ferent from the detachment you are concerned about in
“Beezlebub’s SAT Scores,” your essay on the Unabomber? You talk
about the detached violence that characterizes our era, but you
also warn against “empathy creep,” a kind of “detached indiscrim-
inateness” that might allow one to forgive too much (Trouble 109,
111). Can one forgive too much?
RS: That’s a great question, and such a subtle one. “Detachment” is be-
ing used in two different senses here. In Behave, it concerns a key dis-
tinction between feeling empathy for someone else’s pain and
actually doing something about it—acting compassionately. The lat-
ter is by no means guaranteed by the former, and there’s a danger, in
our era of wildly lauding empathy, of deciding that it is a virtue in
and of itself. So, when does feeling empathy actually lead to acting
compassionately? The point is that feeling someone else’s pain is
painful, and if your empathy is sufficiently intense and visceral (typi-
cally in the form of, “what if this were to happen to me, this would
be awful”), there’s the possibility that the highest priority becomes
getting rid of your pain, by looking the other way. If there is a degree
of detachment (more akin to, “this must be so awful for them”), the
odds of acting compassionately increases. Writ physiologically, the
more your sympathetic nervous system kicks into hysterical high
gear when contemplating someone else’s pain, the more likely you
are to have to turn away.
In the essay you refer to, there is a danger in a different type of detach-
ment, having to dowith a canard about the dangers of a purely biolog-
ical perspective on behavior. It is this supposed inevitable march of
going from “we can explain everything about behavior with biology,”
to “we must forgive everything about behavior because of that,” to a
detached, “and we certainly aren’t justified in doing anything to con-
strain the damaging behaviors of the biologically damaged around
us.” First, if the first step is the case, the very concept of “forgiveness”
becomes irrelevant (as does “blame”). But more importantly, just be-
cause there is (in my view) no “free” will and we have to remember
that when considering the worst of human behaviors, that doesn’t
mean we mustn’t act to protect people from those damaging behav-
iors. If a car’s brakes have failed, blaming it or forgiving it for the
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damage it might do is nonsensical, but you still have to make sure it is
kept off the streets.
HF: That’s a great answer; thank you for the interview.
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